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I. INTRODUCTION
T EAM formation is one of the salient features of multiple mobile agent systems. It is inspired by swarming behavior of living beings, such as flocks of birds, schools of fish, herds of wildebeest, and colonies of bacteria. It is known that such a cooperative biological behavior has certain advantages, including avoiding predators, increasing the chance of finding food, saving energy [1] , etc. Engineering applications of the team formation include automated highway systems [2] , [3] , cooperative robot reconnaissance [4] , manipulation operation [5] , formation flight control [6] - [8] , satellite clustering [9] , distributed sensor networks [10] , self-reconfiguration of metamorphic robotic systems or robotic molecules [11] , etc.
Formation control has been studied in robotics within different structures, such as behavior-based structure, leader-follower structure, and virtual leader structure. The formation control in the behavior-based structure is achieved by building up a group of formation related behaviors [4] . It is suitable for uncertain environments, but lack of a rigorous theoretic analysis. The leader-follower structure is constructed by a string of chain where each robot follows one ( model) or two robots ( model) [12] - [14] . By repeating the and/or models, the team formation can be constructed. However, the chain structure leads to a poor disturbance rejection property. The virtual leader structure constitutes fictitious leaders that represent the desired robot positions. Using receding horizon approaches for the virtual leader structure has been investigated, such as contractive stability constraint [15] and compatibility constraint [16] .
Currently, formation control uses a common team objective as a formation objective, i.e., all the individual robot's interests are added together to form an identical team objective [16] . However, individual robots in a team may have different interests. Simply adding all individual interests together using even weights without considering the interaction dynamics among robots does not guarantee full exploitation of individual interests. Exploring such dynamics will lead to a more reasonable formation control. For example, distributed control can be implemented by using the cost functions that are only related to neighbors, not whole team. Leader-follower control can be implemented by using the tracking cost function for leader robot and the formation cost functions for follower robots. Game theory is an effective tool to model such dynamics existed among multiple robots. Using game theory to analyze multiagent behaviors, such as traffic management [17] and pursuit-evasion problem [18] has been reported recently. The zero-sum game is used to build conservative strategies, such as min-max strategy [19] . Formation control can be modeled as a noncooperative game where the self-enforcing Nash equilibrium can be used as the formation control strategy. The self-enforcing concept implies that no player has incentive to deviate from its Nash equilibrium because no player can gain by unilaterally deviating from it. Robots can adopt this mechanism to establish their strategies to interact with other team members during the process of formation keeping.
Mobile robots with double integrator dynamics can be modeled as a controllable linear system. Formation control cost functions can be casted as a linear quadratic form by using graph theory. Therefore, the formation control of mobile robots with double integrator dynamics can be modeled as a linear-quadratic Nash differential game. Under the framework of this game, the formation control problem is converted to the coupled (asymmetric) Riccati differential equation problem.
The type of coupling between coupled Riccati differential equations depends on the information structure in a game. In the practical control, the state-feedback control is particular demanding. The best way to design a state feedback controller is to use the state feedback information structure in a game. However, the state-feedback differential game is analytically and computationally intricate due to its complex information structure. The open-loop information structure is based on the assumption that the only information players have is their present states and the model structure. It can be interpreted as such that the players simultaneously determine their strategies at the beginning of the game and use this open-loop solution for the whole period of the game. Due to its analytic tractability, the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution is, in particular, very popular for the problems where the underlying model can be described by a set of linear differential equations and individual objectives can be approximated by functions which quadratically penalize deviations from some equilibrium targets [20] , [21] . The finite horizon open-loop Nash equilibrium can be combined with a re-ceding horizon approach to produce a resultant receding horizon Nash control. The use of receding horizon control in differential zero-sum games has been reported in [22] - [24] . It works in such a way; at each step, a state is read and the first control signal in the control profile generated from the open-loop Nash equilibrium is used to control robots. At the next step, this procedure repeats again.
In the following, the formation model is formulated in Section II. The finite horizon open-loop Nash equilibrium is discussed in Section III. The receding horizon state-feedback Nash control strategy is presented in Section IV. The simulation results are provided in Section V. Finally, conclusions and future work are given in Section VI.
II. FORMATION MODEL

A. Robot Dynamics
A team has robots, each of which is described by its dynamics. For robot with -dimensional coordinates , the state and control vectors are and . The robot dynamics are
where . The matrix is the identity matrix of dimension . The state and control vectors of each robot are defined as follows:
By concatenating the states of all robots in a team into a vector , the team dynamics are
where and . The operator is the Kronecker product.
Let be the desired state vector for robot . The desired team state vector is then represented as . The desired state should also have the same dynamics with the robot dynamics (1) (4) and the concatenating state equation is (5) To optimize control performance, the convexity assumption is necessary for optimization algorithms.
Assumption 1 (Convexity Assumption):
is a compact and convex subset of containing the origin in its interior, and is a convex, connected subset of containing in its interior, for every .
B. Formation Graph
A graph can be used to represent the formation control interconnection between robots [5] , [16] , [25] . A vertex of the graph corresponds to a robot and the edges of the graph capture the dependence of the interconnections. Formally, a directed graph consists of a set of vertices , indexed by the robots in a team, and a set of edges , containing ordered pairs of distinct vertices. Assuming the graph has no loops, i.e., implies . A graph is connected if for any vertices , there exists a path of edges in from to . An edge-weighted graph is a graph in which each edge is assigned a weight. The edge is associated with weight . To control a team to keep a formation, the graph connectivity is necessary.
Assumption 2 (Connectivity Assumption): Graph is connected.
The incidence matrix of a directed graph is the -matrix with rows and columns indexed by vertices of and edges of , respectively, such that the th entry of is equal to 1 if the vertex is the head of the edge if the vertex is the tail of the edge , and 0, otherwise. If graph has vertices and edges, then incidence matrix of the graph has order [26] . The cohesion and separation of formation control is defined by the desired distance vector between two neighbors and . The formation error vector is defined as for edge . Let . From the definition of the incidence matrix, we know the whole team formation error can be expressed in a matrix form (6) where and is a diagonal weight matrix with dimension . We use for . Following [26] , we define the Laplacian of a graph as (7) For a directed graph , the Laplacian is independent of the choice of graph orientation. The Laplacian is symmetric and positive semi-definite.
For real value matrices with appropriate dimensions, the Kronecker product has the following properties:
Based on these properties, we have (8) is also symmetric and positive semi-definite. The team formation error is rewritten as follows:
C. Formation Cost Functions
The finite horizon cost function of the formation control for robot can be expressed as follows: (10) where is the finite time horizon and are the weight parameters. The cost function (10) can be transformed into a standard linear-quadratic form (11) where , , , .
and are symmetric and positive semi-definite. The formation cost functions are used to design controllers, which can control robots to have the desired distances . To track a specific trajectory , the leader robot should track . Thus, the cost function of the leader robot should include a linear-quadratic standard tracking term (12) where , , and . and are also symmetric and positive semi-definite. The leader robot can use and , which means the leader robot only tracks the desired trajectory without taking the formation error into account. In such situation, it is the follower robots who keep the formation by following the leader with a fixed distance.
In the following, the weight matrixes in the cost functions are denoted as and for both leader robots or follower robots. From the state equations (3) and (5) and the cost functions (11) and (12), it can be seen that the formation control is a linear-quadratic tracking problem. By using error state and control vectors, the formation control is viewed as a linear-quadratic regulating problem with as the state vector and as the control vector in the following presentation.
III. FINITE HORIZON OPEN-LOOP NASH DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
A. Nash Differential Games
Each robot in a team can be viewed as a player or decision maker of a differential game. The robot dynamic (3) is the state equation of the differential game with the given initial state and rewritten here (13) where and . The cost function defined in (10) is known to each player. The players in the game need to minimize their cost functions in order to find their strategies or it can be said that the robots in the team need to minimize their cost functions in order to find their controllers. If all players have the same cost function, it is a team game. In a team game, the differential game problem is mapped down to an optimal control problem. As the states and control signals are coupled together through the cost function, it is difficult to implement distributed controllers in a team game. Using different cost functions, individual robots can select neighbors and implement distributed controllers. If players have different cost functions, the optimal control theory used for a single cost function cannot be used to solve the problem. Instead the Nash equilibria have to be found. A Nash equilibrium is a collection of strategies for all players in a group and is a best response strategy of each player to the other players' strategies. No one in the group can gain higher benefits by changing its strategy while the other players keep their strategies fixed or stationary. A collection of strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if the following inequalities are satisfied for all :
Two types of information structures are interested in differential games: open-loop and state-feedback information structures. In the open-loop information structure, all players make their decisions based on the initial state . Each player computes its equilibrium strategy at the beginning of the game and no state feedback is available during the whole control period. In the state-feedback information structure, all players make their decisions based on the current state . The state-feedback information structure provides more information than the open-loop information structure. Accordingly, the players make more reasonable decisions based on the state-feedback information structure than the open-loop information structure. How-ever, due to the analysis complexity, this paper only concentrates on the open-loop information structure.
To derive a state-feedback controller for practical uses in formation control, the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution can be combined with a receding horizon approach to synthesize a state-feedback controller: receding horizon Nash control. In this receding horizon Nash control, each robot computes its open-loop Nash equilibrium at each time instant, but is not committed to follow that equilibrium during the whole period. It only uses it to control one step. In the next step, this procedure repeats again. This receding horizon approach will be discussed in Section IV.
B. Linear Quadratic Open-Loop Nash Equilibria
Under the open-loop information structure of a Nash game, the derivation of open-loop Nash equilibria is closely related to the problem of jointly solving optimal control problem [27, p. 267]. According to the minimum principle, the conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium for two player games are given in [21, Th. 7.2] . This result can be generalized straightforward to player games [21, p. 327]. We quote this result here for our formation control problem.
Theorem 1: For an -robot formation control defined as a finite horizon open-loop Nash differential game by (13) and (14), let there exist a solution set to the coupled Riccati differential equations (15) where . Then the formation control has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution for every initial state as follows: (16) (17) where is the closed-loop system matrix. It is easily verified that . The closedloop system is (18) The theorem proof can be found in [21] . Remmark 1: Due to the stated assumption 1 (convexity) and 2 (connectivity), the cost functions are strictly convex functions of for all admissible control functions and for all . This implies that the conditions following from the minimum principle are both necessary and sufficient.
Based on the theorem 1, the solvability of the coupled Riccati differential (15) Theorem 2: For a -robot finite horizon formation control defined as a finite horizon open-loop Nash differential game by (13) and (14), the coupled Riccati differential (15) has a solution for every initial state on if and only if matrix is invertible.
Proof: For the formation control of the multiple robot systems (13) , it is known that is stabilizable. As the Laplacian is symmetrical and positive semi-definite and , the symmetrical Riccati differential equations (20) have a symmetrical solution on , for all . This result combining with that is invertible proves the coupled Riccati differential equations (15) also has the same block structure. Denote by as the th block of , we have . The invertibility of depends on and . It has been shown in [21] and [27] that different leads to different invertibility of . In the finite receding horizon Nash control discussed in Section IV, is the length of control horizon. The selection of in the finite receding horizon control should guarantee that is invertible.
IV. STATE-FEEDBACK FORMATION CONTROL
A. Receding Horizon Nash Control
Assuming the current time instant is and the current state vector is . At each time instant, the receding horizon control uses as the initial state vector to find the finite horizon open-loop Nash equilibrium based on the following cost function: (21) The receding horizon control signal is defined as (22) As the control signal depends on the current state , the receding horizon Nash control is a state-feedback control. The existence conditions of the receding horizon Nash control is the same as those of the finite horizon open-loop Nash control, i.e., the receding horizon Nash control exists for every initial state if and only if matrix is invertible. The receding horizon Nash control needs to check whether or not the closed-loop system is stable. The closed-loop system with the receding horizon Nash control (22) is (23) where the closed-loop system matrix . The following result can be made about the receding horizon Nash control.
The formation control defined as a finite horizon Nash differential game (13) , (21) has a receding horizon Nash control for every initial state if and only if matrix is invertible. As long as all the eigenvalues of have negative real parts, the receding horizon Nash control is asymptotic stable.
B. Distributed Control
The receding horizon Nash control signal (22) needs the state vector , which includes all states from the formation team. However, the weight parameters and in the Nash game can be selected as zero for robot if robot is not its neighbor. This selection will lead to the following matrix form of and :
where or is a block with size . and has blocks. The th block row or column consists of zero blocks. It should be noted that matrix has a block diagonal structure. Based on these matrix structures, it can be found the th block row of solution consists of zero blocks from the coupled Riccati differential (15) and the equation shown at the bottom of the page.
Therefore, the receding horizon Nash control (23) does not need the state from nonneighbor robot . If there is more than one robot in the team, which are not the neighbors of robot , the same conclusion can be made. Thus, is a distributed control law. 3) construct the receding horizon Nash control based on the open loop Nash equilibrium for the period (22); 4) use the receding horizon Nash control to control robots. The resulting state trajectory should be 5) update ; 6) loop until the control achieves a satisfying performance.
C. Receding Horizon Nash Control Algorithm
V. SIMULATIONS
The dimension of the coordinate vectors for all robots is . Simulation tests a triangle formation shape with four robots and a hexagon formation shape with six robots (see Fig. 1 ). The vertex nodes 1-6 are represented by circle, cross, square, star, triangle, and pentagram in Fig. 1 , respectively.
The tracking trajectories are assumed to be a circle and a sinusoid. The circle is defined as (24) and the sinusoid is defined as (25) The desired inputs of these two trajectories are and , respectively. In the simulation, the triangle formation is to track the circle trajectory and the hexagon formation is to track the sinusoid trajectory.
In the triangle formation tracking the circle trajectory, robot 1 is used as the leader robot. The proposed distributed receding horizon Nash controller is tested first. The simulation has the following two tasks.
• T1: The leader robot 1 uses the cost function (12) , which includes a formation cost represented by and a tracking cost represented by . The follower robots use the cost function (11) , which only includes a formation cost represented by .
• T2: The leader robot 1 only uses the tracking cost function represented by (without the formation cost, in (12)). The follower robots use the same cost function (11). The incidence matrix of the triangle shape is
The leader robot's tracking weight matrix is selected as . In the triangle formation, the neighbors of the leader robot 1 are robot 2 and 4, the neighbors of robot 2 are robot 1 and 3, the neighbor of robot 3 robot 2, and the neighbor of robot 4 is robot 1. So, their formation cost weight matrixes are selected as
The cost weight matrixes for control are selected to be the same for . Solutions to the coupled Riccati differential equations of the finite horizon open-loop Nash differential games can be found by using terminal values and the backward iteration. The finite horizon length 10 s and sample time is 0.1 s. The longer finite horizon length can lead to better performance, but more calculations in solving the coupled Riccati differential equations. Through calculation, it can be seen that is invertible and all eigenvalues of have negative real parts. Therefore, the receding horizon Nash control is asymptotic stable.
The trajectories of the four robots in T1 are shown in Fig. 2 . The leader robot 1 use both tracking cost function and formation cost function. The results show that all four trajectories converge to a triangle shape during the circle tracking. control errors between the robot control signals and their tracking control error signals are shown in Fig. 3 . All control error signals converge to zero, i.e., the robot control signals converges to the tracking position errors converge to zero, i.e., all robots finally move in the circle trajectories.
In T2, the leader robot 1 only use the tracking cost function. Again, all robots can track the circle after the initial transient process. The position errors are shown in Fig. 5 . All these errors have the convergent property. Due to the only use of the tracking cost function, the leader robot just tracks the circle trajectory without considering the formation error. It can be seen that its position errors (solid line) are kept as zero. This is due to the initial the position being the same as the tracking trajectory. The leader robot only adjusts its position error to catch up with the circle. The use of a leader without a cost on the formation can make the formation control to work in a leader-follower structure. The leader robot 1 does not need state information from the followers and it can track the desired trajectory better.
Second, a team game (T3) is simulated by selecting the weight parameters of all robots the same as . In the team game, all robots need to communicate with all other robots to obtain the feedback states. In addition to the formation cost function, all four robots are leader robots and use the cost function For comparison, the values of the weight matrices are selected to be the same:
. and position errors between the robots and their tracking trajectories of all four robots are shown in Fig. 6 . Comparing the results of the team game (T3) with these of two Nash games (T1,T2), it can be seen that the team game has the best team performance. All errors in the team game converge to zero very quickly although the robot 1 is not good as in the leader-follower game. This is due to the use of tracking cost functions for all robots and the complete team state information. In the Nash games, only robot 1 has the tracking cost function, each robot only interacts with its neighbors, and the partial team state information is used. Finally, the hexagon formation (T4) is simulated for the sinusoid tracking. Each robot has two neighbors as shown in Fig. 1 and the leader robot 1 only use the tracking cost function. The trajectories of the six robots are shown in Fig. 7 . The results show that all six trajectories asymptotically converge to a hexagon shape.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes to exploit the mechanism of noncooperative games to handle the formation control problem. Through building the Nash equilibria, all team members can find a selfenforcing controller, which can guarantee the formation control exists and is stable in terms of their individual cost functions. The existence and uniqueness of the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution are investigated. The state-feedback control can be synthesized through the receding horizon Nash control.
Through selection of the cost functions, the formation control can work in distributed way where individual robots only communicate with neighbors, in leader-follower way where the leader only tracks the desired trajectory and followers only follow the leader, or in team games where all robots try to keep formation and track their own desired trajectories.
In the next step, we will concentrate on the constrained control under the framework of the receding horizon Nash control because the constrained control can deal with the practical problems, such as saturation constraints of the control signal. It can also explicitly handle the collision avoiding problem by converting the collision avoiding problem into state constraints.
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